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AN OFFICER WALKS INTO A BAR:  
ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEED  
FOR DETERRENCE  
IN OFFICER AND DIRECTOR BARS 
Steven W. Shuldman* 
 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the civil 
regulatory agency responsible for helping to defend and protect the 
American investor.  One significant threat to investor security occurs when 
an individual, acting as an officer or director, violates a fiduciary duty to 
his or her employer and its shareholders, risking investor money.  These 
actions could involve insider trading, fraudulent statements in public 
filings, or other self-serving conduct. 
Recognizing the importance of deterring such misconduct, Congress gave 
the SEC the authority to bar certain individuals from serving as officers 
and directors of public companies.  An individual should be barred if he 
has demonstrated unfitness to serve in that capacity.  Unfortunately, the 
current standard has resulted in inconsistent applications across different 
types of misconduct and has been unresponsive to both legislative 
enactments and widespread management misconduct leading up to the 2008 
financial crisis, which has eroded its effectiveness as a key deterrence 
mechanism in the SEC’s arsenal. 
This Note begins by exploring the roles held by directors and officers and 
why effective corporate governance is critical to the functioning of the 
capital markets.  Next, this Note discusses how the existing unfitness 
standard has failed to address Congress’s intent to deter misconduct and 
has not appropriately responded to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which 
amended the statutory requirement for granting a bar.  Ultimately, this 
Note proposes a new standard for officer and director unfitness that gives 
less opportunity for inconsistent results, focuses on the risk of future 
misconduct, and properly responds to recent legislative enactments and 
market events such as the 2008 financial crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Charles C. Conaway, the chief executive officer of the publicly traded 
company Kmart, overpurchases inventory that his company cannot afford.1  
He lies about Kmart‘s true ability to pay for the inventory it has committed 
to buy, and he conspires to make materially false representations in Kmart‘s 
financial statements.2  Unsuspecting investors then rely on this 
misinformation and purchase Kmart stock.3  Ultimately, the fraud is 
uncovered, and Conaway is terminated as CEO, but too late for the Board 
of Directors to prevent the company‘s bankruptcy.4  When news of the 
fraud becomes public, Kmart‘s stock plummets, wiping out millions of 
dollars in value from the investments of unsuspecting individuals.5 
Brent C. Bankosky, a director at Takeda Pharmaceuticals International 
Inc., finds out his employer is about to announce a major acquisition.6  
Bankosky deliberately trades his employer‘s stock in advance of the 
lucrative deal‘s public announcement.7  Based on his trading before the deal 
is announced, he makes $63,000.8 
Each of these individuals committed misconduct that compromised his 
duty to his employer and violated the law.  But, should each face an 
identical court order prohibiting him from serving as an officer or director 
of a public company? 
Among the many legal remedies available against violators of federal 
securities laws,9 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can 
seek a moratorium on a defendant‘s ability to serve as an officer or director 
of a public company.10  15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2012) provides that an 
individual merits such a bar if he or she has demonstrated ―unfitness‖ to 
serve in such a capacity.11  In practice, the standard for determining 
whether a defendant is unfit is an examination of his or her behavior against 
a list of nonexhaustive factors.12  The current standard, however, results in 
inconsistent remedies across similarly situated defendants, relies too heavily 
 
 1. See infra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 149–58 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 32, 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra Part I.C. 
 11. See infra Part I.C. 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
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on concepts from criminal law, and fails to take into account statutory 
enactments and management misconduct during the recent financial crisis.13 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the SEC, the roles of officers 
and directors, and the common tests courts have used to determine 
unfitness.  Part II examines the discretionary nature of the existing legal 
standards, explores inconsistencies, and highlights the consequences of 
using these existing standards.  Finally, Part III proposes a revised standard 
to assess unfitness and better deter misconduct.  The new standard reduces 
inconsistent results by eliminating certain ―intangible considerations‖—
such as defendant contrition and reputational impact—from the test.  It also 
focuses on deterrence instead of criminal punishment as the purpose of the 
remedy and responds to legislative enactments and recent management 
misconduct. 
I.   ―UNFIT‖ OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS  
AND THE SEC‘S ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
Part I of this Note provides a background on the legal standards for 
determining whether an individual is ―unfit‖ to serve as an officer or 
director.  Part I.A explores the roles of officers and directors of public 
corporations, their duties to employers and shareholders, and the rationale 
behind penalties for officers and directors who violate these duties.  Part I.B 
discusses the history of the Commission and its responsibility to enforce 
federal securities laws.  Next, Part I.C examines two cases, SEC v. Patel14 
and SEC v. Levine,15 that courts have heavily relied upon to determine 
whether a defendant is unfit to serve as an officer or director and should 
therefore receive a bar. 
A.   Officers and Directors:  Their Duties and Roles 
An officer is a ―person elected or appointed by the board of directors to 
manage the daily operations of a corporation.‖16  Common examples are 
CEOs, presidents, and corporate treasurers.17  Officers derive their authority 
from the corporation‘s bylaws or by resolution of the board of directors.18  
A director is a ―person appointed or elected to sit on a board that manages 
the affairs of a corporation or other organization by electing and exercising 
control over its officers.‖19 
 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
 14. 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 15. 517 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 16. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (10th ed. 2014). 
 17. Id. 
 18. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (2005).  This Note will reference Delaware state 
corporate law as applicable.  Nearly half of all registered corporations are incorporated in the 
state of Delaware.  Leslie Wayne, To Delaware, With Love:  The Workings of a Tax Haven, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2012, at BU4. 
 19. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 557. 
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Officers and directors owe a variety of fiduciary duties to the 
corporations they serve.20  Generally, a fiduciary is ―[s]omeone who is 
required to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the 
scope of their relationship.‖21  The Model Business Corporation Act22 
prescribes the following duties of corporate officers: 
An officer, when performing in such capacity, has the duty to act: (1) in 
good faith; (2) with the care that a person in a like position would 
reasonably exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner the 
officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.23 
These responsibilities impart two principal duties on officers:  the duty of 
care and the duty of loyalty.24  Under Delaware law, a board of directors 
owes fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.25  Directors 
are subject to the same duties as corporate officers.26 
Fiduciary duties are fundamental to the success of effective corporate 
governance and management:  Justice Cardozo, writing for the New York 
Court of Appeals, referred to such responsibilities as ―the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive.‖27  While detailed standards of professional 
conduct exist for other professionals, such as lawyers or accountants,28 the 
framework of corporate fiduciary duty and proper conduct has evolved 
largely through common law.29  The underlying framework of fiduciary 
duty is to protect shareholders, since other nonshareholder participants in 
 
 20. See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 
243–44 (2009).  Fiduciary duties arise in relationships, which rise to a level above and 
beyond a nonfiduciary, contractual relationship governed by precise contract terms and 
―comparatively low standard[s] of good faith and fair dealing.‖ Id. at 244. 
 21. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 743. 
 22. See generally MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2010). The Model Business Corporation Act 
is a model set of statutes that legislatures may consider when passing state corporate law but 
carries no weight or authority unless states decide to codify it. Elliott Goldstein, Revision of 
the Model Business Corporation Act, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1985). 
 23. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42(a)(1)–(3) (2010). 
 24. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) 
(discussing responsibilities of care); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) 
(discussing loyalty).  The duty of care requires officers to exercise a degree of diligence, 
care, and skill that a reasonably prudent person in similar circumstances would use. In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005).  Officers also owe a 
duty of loyalty to avoid any conflict between their duty and self-interest. Ivanhoe Partners v. 
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987). 
 25. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (incorporating 
fiduciary duty of loyalty into Delaware corporate law). 
 26. See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009). 
 27. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).  While this case addresses the 
role of a fiduciary in the context of a partnership, it is nonetheless frequently recognized as 
establishing the foundational understanding of modern-day corporate fiduciary duties. Sarah 
Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors:  The 
Disney Standard and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 224 (2006). 
 28. See infra Part I.D.1 (discussing the professional standards of conduct for accountants 
and attorneys). 
 29. See Frank Partnoy, Financial Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 799, 801 
(2006). 
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the capital structure are protected primarily through contract law.30  
Fiduciary duties require officers and directors to refrain from misconduct 
that might harm the company or its shareholders.31 
B.   The SEC and Its Role 
Established by the Securities Exchange Act of 193432 (the ―Exchange 
Act‖), the Commission was created to protect investors from fraud and 
manipulative devices and to promote ethical behavior, honesty, and fair 
dealing in financial markets.33  In addition to the Exchange Act, the 
Commission enforces other federal securities laws, including the Securities 
Act of 1933,34 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200235 (the ―Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act‖), and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010.36  The SEC has the authority to conduct investigations and 
bring civil actions in U.S. federal district courts or administrative 
proceedings in front of an independent administrative law judge (ALJ).37  
The Commission can seek civil fines, penalties, disgorgement,38 and 
injunctive relief against violators of federal securities laws.39  Injunctive 
relief is the primary statutory remedy for violations of such laws.40  The 
SEC will usually enjoin defendants from further violations of federal 
securities laws, though it may also seek an officer and director bar.41 
The Commission only has civil authority in seeking relief for violations 
of federal securities statutes.42  Criminal investigation and prosecution is 
exclusively within the purview of the Department of Justice (DOJ), though 
 
 30. Id. at 802.  Therefore, shareholders, who do not have the shelter of contractual 
remedies, require protection via fiduciary duties which flow to them from the officers and 
directors of the corporation. Id. at 803. 
 31. Cf. Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1309, 1316–17 (2008) (detailing a number of ways that other parties, such as creditors, 
can usurp shareholder interests). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.). 
 33. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). 
 34. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2012)). 
 35. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 36. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 
U.S.C.). 
 37. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2012). 
 38. Disgorgement is ―[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits illegally obtained) 
on demand or by legal compulsion.‖  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 568.  For 
example, an individual that gained $100,000 through illegal insider trading may be required 
to ―disgorge,‖ or give up, the illegal gain of $100,000, in addition to any other statutory 
fines, penalties, or injunctive relief. 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2012).  An injunction is a ―court order commanding or 
preventing an action.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 904. 
 40. SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 41. Id.  Orders enjoining a defendant from future violations of the securities laws were 
the original enforcement mechanism granted to the Commission and are not intended to 
punish but rather to deter future behavior. David Franklin Levy, The Impact of the Remedies 
Act on the SEC’s Ability to Obtain Injunctive Relief, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 645, 647–48 (1994).  
The basis for such injunctive relief is statutory rather than equitable. Id. at 649. 
 42. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 16.2[0][A] (6th ed. 
2009). 
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the SEC may conduct a ―parallel proceeding‖ in which a civil SEC action 
occurs alongside a DOJ criminal investigation or proceeding.43 
C.   Officer and Director Bars 
An officer and director bar is a court declaration prohibiting an individual 
from serving as an officer or director of a public company.44  Federal 
securities laws define a ―public company‖ as having $10 million in assets 
and over 500 individual shareholders.45  The authority to seek officer and 
director bars was first statutorily granted to the SEC in the Securities 
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (the 
―Remedies Act‖).46 
When considering the Remedies Act, Congress noted that judicial 
authority to grant officer and director bars likely existed under a court‘s 
―inherent equitable powers to grant ancillary relief‖ to enforce the federal 
securities laws.47  Yet explicit statutory authority was nevertheless included 
in the Remedies Act to ensure that there would be no doubt as to the 
availability of officer and director bars.48  While corporate governance 
issues are typically matters determined by state law, Congress wanted to 
ensure an additional remedy would exist to protect the investing public 
from fraudulent misconduct.49  Congress therefore wrote officer and 
director bar authority into the Remedies Act to ―permit the Commission to 
achieve the appropriate level of deterrence‖ in order to ―maintain investor 
confidence in the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of [the nation‘s] 
 
 43. Mark D. Hunter, SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings:  Contemplating the Propriety of 
Recent Judicial Trends, 68 MO. L. REV. 149, 149 (2003).  Hunter‘s article discusses the 
history of statutory and case law authority for such ―parallel proceedings.‖ Id. at 150–58.  
While the two agencies‘ investigations may overlap, their prosecutorial authority is distinct. 
See, e.g., SEC v. Carter, 907 F.2d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding a due process violation 
where the SEC prosecuted a criminal contempt action against defendants who had infringed 
a civil injunctive order). 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2). 
 45. Id. § 78l(g)(1)(A). 
 46. Philip F.S. Berg, Unfit to Serve:  Permanently Barring People from Serving as 
Officers and Directors of Publicly Traded Companies After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1875 (2003).  Though the Commission was granted the explicit 
statutory authority to seek officer and director bars in the Remedies Act, it frequently 
previously had argued that the bar existed within its inherent authority. Id.  While arguably 
the SEC possessed the authority to seek officer and director bars prior to Congress‘s grant of 
explicit statutory authority, only one court had ever recognized the bar as falling within the 
Commission‘s ancillary relief, though that decision was made after the Remedies Act was 
passed. See SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing the Commission‘s 
inherent authority to seek officer and director bars despite explicit statutory directive). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1394, 
1990 WL 256464. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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securities markets.‖50  Civil remedies in general are rooted in the concept of 
deterrence rather than punishment.51 
The Senate Banking Committee observed that a ―permanent bar might be 
appropriate if the violation were particularly egregious or the violator was a 
recidivist.‖52  It further noted that officer and director bars were necessary 
because the ―public shareholders may lack sufficient control to remove 
securities law violators from office or otherwise to protect their own 
interests.‖53  The committee further noted that ―broader public interests are 
involved when the actions of the violator undermine the integrity of the 
markets.‖54 
As SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar noted, officer and director bars are 
one of the most influential tools at the SEC‘s disposal.55  The threat of a bar 
goes beyond the typical ―cost of doing business‖ monetary penalty because 
it carries with it severe professional and economic consequences that could 
force a violator to change careers and seriously jeopardize the individual‘s 
financial well-being.56 
Having explored the history, purpose, and utility of the bar, this section 
next will discuss the standard for granting one.  The statutory language 
permits a court to issue a bar if an officer or director has ―demonstrate[d] an 
unfitness‖ to serve further in that capacity.57 
To determine whether an individual has demonstrated such ―unfitness‖ to 
serve, a district court maintains ―substantial discretion.‖58  Yet courts and 
scholars alike have set out to attempt to prescribe and refine standards for 
determining unfitness.59  The following sections will outline leading cases 
that have helped courts make this determination. 
 
 50. Id. at 13–14 (emphasis added). 
 51. See United States v. Phelps Dodge Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1340, 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984) (―The civil penalty is not designed to punish or to assign moral culpability, but to 
deter.‖). 
 52. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 21 (1990), 1990 WL 263550. 
 53. Id. at 22. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Luis Aguilar, Comm‘r, SEC, Taking a No-Nonsense Approach to Enforcing the 
Federal Securities Laws (Oct. 18, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171491510#_edn26. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2012).  Section 21(d)(2) currently provides: 
[T]he court may prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for 
such period of time as it shall determine, any person who violated section 
[10(b)] of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder from acting as an officer 
or director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 
[12] of this title or that is required to file reports pursuant to section [15(d)] of this 
title if the person‘s conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or director 
of any such issuer. Id. (emphasis added). 
 58. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 59. See Jayne W. Barnard, When Is a Corporate Executive “Substantially Unfit to 
Serve”?, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1492–93 (1992). 
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1.   The Second Circuit‘s Six Factor Approach in SEC v. Patel 
In SEC v. Patel, the Second Circuit relied heavily on a Jayne Barnard 
article to establish a group of factors to consider when determining whether 
to grant an officer and director bar.60 
The facts of the case were as follows:  Ratilal K. Patel, the defendant, 
was a director and senior vice president of Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. (―Par‖), 
which manufactured generic drugs.61  Par submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) an application for a new drug, which falsely claimed 
that the drug had been tested for and met specific FDA requirements.62  
Knowing that the application had been falsified, Patel sold 75,000 shares of 
Par common stock at an average sale price of approximately $21.63  When 
knowledge of the false application became public, Par‘s stock price dropped 
dramatically, from a $10 closing price the day before the public 
announcement to between $7.125 and $8.375 in the days after.64  The SEC 
won disgorgement of losses, civil penalties, and a permanent officer and 
director bar in the district court.65  Patel then appealed to the Second 
Circuit.66 
After outlining the defendant‘s behavior, the court put forth a new 
standard in determining whether misconduct merited a bar.67  The Second 
Circuit held that a court may consider:  ―(1) the egregiousness of the 
underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant‘s repeat offender 
status; (3) the defendant‘s role or position when he engaged in the fraud; 
(4) the defendant‘s degree of scienter; (5) the defendant‘s economic stake in 
the violation; and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur.‖68  The 
Second Circuit also emphasized that while the six factors can assist in 
making an unfitness assessment, they are not necessarily ―the only 
factors . . . [to] be taken into account,‖ and it is not ―necessary to apply 
all . . . in every case.‖69  Applying the factors, the Second Circuit affirmed 
Patel‘s permanent bar.70  A discussion of the Patel factors and its progeny 
follows below. 
The first factor courts will consider is egregiousness.71  Courts have 
generally eschewed a hard-line definition of egregiousness, instead citing 
specific behavior that constitutes egregiousness on a case-by-case basis.72  
 
 60. Patel, 61 F.3d at 141 (citing Barnard, supra note 59, at 1492–93). 
 61. Id. at 138. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 139. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 141 (internal citations omitted). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 142. 
 71. Id. at 141. 
 72. See, e.g., SEC v. Bankosky, No. 12 Civ. 1012 (HB), 2012 WL 1849000, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2012), aff’d, 716 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing numerous fact-specific 
examples of egregious behavior). 
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One consideration is whether the conduct represented an isolated 
occurrence or if it occurred over an extended time period.73  Courts have 
found that misconduct over a span of time is nonetheless ―isolated‖ if it is 
performed in furtherance of the same scheme to defraud.74  However, other 
courts have found ―egregious‖ conduct in a single fraudulent scheme.75  In 
a Patel analysis, it is ―recognize[d] that the line between denying liability 
and arguing that violations [are] not egregious is a fine one.‖76  Courts have 
declined to find egregiousness for reasonable reliance on counsel.77  Such a 
determination, however, is not dispositive of liability altogether.78 
Second, courts will consider the defendant‘s repeat-offender status.79  
―Repeat offender‖ denotes a defendant who has previously been found 
liable of securities fraud.80  However, the fact that a defendant is not a 
repeat offender does not preclude barring officer or director service.81 
Third, courts will consider the defendant‘s role or position at the time of 
the fraud.82  The formal title or position of an individual is not dispositive—
the inquiry is whether the bar is necessary to prevent similar acts that can be 
reasonably anticipated from the defendant‘s past conduct.83  The standard 
does not require a defendant to hold a formal title of ―officer‖ or ―director‖; 
rather, any employee ―acting in a corporate or fiduciary capacity‖ or subject 
to a company‘s policies (such as those prohibiting insider trading) may be 
subject to a bar.84 
 
 73. See SEC v. Maxxon, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 975 H(J), 2005 WL 6090229, at *5 (N.D. 
Okla. Mar. 11, 2005) (imposing a five-year bar against defendant who had ―made misleading 
statements over a period of years‖). 
 74. SEC v. Conaway, 697 F. Supp. 2d 733, 772 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (holding defendant‘s 
―course of conduct causing the securities violations span[ning] several months‖ was actually 
a single wrongful course of conduct); SEC v. Johnson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 40, 44 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(finding several different actions of concealment with ultimate goal of the false ―inclusion of 
one item of revenue‖ constituted an ―isolated incident‖ (citing SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 
F.2d 1149, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1978))). 
 75. SEC v. Aimsi Techs., Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 296, 299, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding 
defendant‘s conduct ―egregious‖ in perpetrating a single ―pump and dump‖ scheme over a 
span of several months). 
 76. SEC v. Selden, 632 F. Supp. 2d 91, 97 (D. Mass. 2009).  This distinction is 
particularity important when performing a Patel analysis because arguing behavior was not 
―egregious‖ weighs against the imposition of an officer or director bar, yet denying 
wrongdoing if the court finds there was misconduct weighs strongly in favor of a bar.  
Therefore, defendants must decide between arguing their behavior was not ―egregious‖ or 
conceding egregious misconduct and expressing remorse. 
 77. Id. at 98. 
 78. Id.  In Selden, the court found that ―egregious‖ and ―liability‖ were not one in the 
same:  the defendant was still liable for a two-year bar, even though his conduct was not 
―egregious.‖ Id. 
 79. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 80. SEC v. Metcalf, No. 11 Civ. 493 (CM), 2012 WL 5519358, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
13, 2012); SEC v. iShopNoMarkup.com, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4057 (DRH)(ARL), 2012 WL 
716928, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2012). 
 81. See SEC v. Bankosky, No. 12 Civ. 1012 (HB), 2012 WL 1849000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 21, 2012), aff’d, 716 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 82. Patel, 61 F.3d at 141. 
 83. SEC v. Huff, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 84. Bankosky, 2012 WL 1849000, at *2. 
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Fourth, courts will consider a defendant‘s scienter.85  Generally, scienter 
is ―an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.‖86  In connection with 
securities fraud violations, scienter can also include recklessness, or at least, 
a ―knowing misconduct.‖87  Whether a court finds scienter is not 
necessarily dispositive of whether the court will issue an officer and 
director bar.88  The existence of scienter can also be rebutted by showing a 
defendant‘s good faith reliance on an expert, such as legal counsel.89 
Fifth, courts will consider a defendant‘s economic stake in the alleged 
misconduct.90  This factor includes an examination of a defendant‘s 
personal economic gain when determining whether to grant an officer and 
director bar.91  Some courts have opined that granting a permanent officer 
and director bar is ―‗far too draconian a remedy‘ where [a d]efendant did 
not actually gain any money from his violation of the Exchange Act.‖92  
Where there is clear and substantial economic gain, a court will weigh in 
favor of a permanent bar.93  However, a defendant‘s mere hope of a 
significant economic gain (without actually having reaped it) has been 
sufficient for a court to grant a bar.94 
Last, courts will consider the likelihood that a defendant‘s misconduct 
will recur.95  The likelihood that the defendant will engage in future 
misconduct is of ―particular importance‖ to a court when considering 
whether to order a bar, and how severe a bar to impose.96  ―[I]t is not 
 
 85. Patel, 61 F.3d at 141. 
 86. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 1547.  Scienter is used most frequently 
in the context of securities fraud. Id.  The Supreme Court has held that scienter is required to 
establish a claim for damages under SEC Rule 10b-5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
185, 185–86 (1976). 
 87. SEC v. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d 301, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 88. See SEC v. Dibella, No. 3:04 Civ. 1342 (EBB), 2008 WL 6965807, at *11 (D. Conn. 
Mar. 13, 2008) (declining to impose a bar because defendant‘s actions were not ―egregious‖ 
and he had no prior securities law violations). 
 89. Howard v. SEC, 376 F.3d 1136, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that good faith 
reliance on counsel is ―evidence of good faith, a relevant consideration in evaluating a 
defendant‘s scienter‖). 
 90. Patel, 61 F.3d at 141. 
 91. See SEC v. Robinson, No. 00 Civ. 7452, 2002 WL 1552049, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 
16, 2002) (framing discussion of ―economic stake‖ in terms of a defendant‘s stock holdings 
and receipt of suspect company loans). 
 92. SEC v. Jasper, 883 F. Supp. 2d 915, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting SEC v. Johnson, 
595 F. Supp. 2d 40, 45 (N.D. Ga. 2009)) (considering economic stake). But see Dirks v. 
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) (considering, in the context of a Rule 10b-5 violation for 
insider trading, that a defendant‘s gain could be ―pecuniary‖ or a ―reputational benefit,‖ 
either of which could increase the potential for future earnings). 
 93. See, e.g., SEC v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 426 (D. Md. 2005) (finding a 
permanent bar appropriate where the ―[d]efendant‘s role was central‖ to the scheme, which 
involved ―millions of dollars‖). 
 94. SEC v. Miller, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (holding defendant‘s 
hope of ―significant economic stake in the outcome,‖ notwithstanding that his ―actual gains 
were not substantial,‖ nonetheless merited a five-year bar (citing Patel, 61 F.3d at 141)). 
 95. Patel, 61 F.3d at 141. 
 96. SEC v. Selden, 632 F. Supp. 2d 91, 99 (D. Mass 2009) (citing Patel, 61 F.3d at 141–
42). 
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essential for a lifetime ban that there be past violations.‖97  ―However, ‗in 
the absence of such violations, [it is essential] that a district court articulate 
the factual basis‘‖ for its finding that there is a likelihood that misconduct 
will recur.98  The court can consider a defendant‘s refusal to admit to or 
take responsibility for his actions as indicative of potential future 
misconduct.99  The court may also determine that continued service in a 
position ―of significant power‖ suggests a potential for future 
misconduct.100 
After setting forth the six factors, the Patel court noted that the governing 
statute provides for a bar on service that is either conditional or 
unconditional (i.e., limited to a certain industry) and either permanent or 
time-limited (―for such period of time [as the court] shall determine‖).101  
The court interpreted those provisions to ―suggest that, before imposing a 
permanent bar, the court should consider whether a conditional 
bar . . . and/or a bar limited in time . . . might be sufficient.‖102 
The Patel court, therefore, left district courts to decide between 
permanent and unconditional bars or temporary and conditional ones, but it 
called for courts to specifically articulate their rationale when doing so.103  
Despite this, some courts have failed to articulate this final step.104 
2.   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Statutory Amendment  
from ―Substantial Unfitness‖ to ―Unfitness‖ 
Seven years after Patel, in the drafting and passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Congress amended the statutory language from ―substantial 
unfitness‖ to ―unfitness.‖105  Patel had been decided under ―an earlier 
version of section 21(d)(2), which permitted a ban only ‗if the person‘s 
conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or 
director.‘‖106  Congress‘s intent in changing the standard was to ―lower the 
threshold of misconduct for which courts may impose director and officer 
bans‖ from the prior statutory language.107  Despite the change, courts 
 
 97. Patel, 61 F.3d at 142. 
 98. SEC v. E. Delta Res. Corp., No. 10 Civ. 310 (SJF)(WDW), 2012 WL 3903478, at *9 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012) (citing Patel, 61 F.3d at 142). 
 99. SEC v. Drucker, 528 F. Supp. 2d 450, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting defendant‘s 
refusal to admit to the ―brazenness of his misconduct‖). 
 100. SEC v. Universal Express, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 412, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 101. Patel, 61 F.3d at 142.  The idea that a court should specifically articulate why it was 
granting a permanent bar over a temporary one was first articulated in Steadman v. SEC, 603 
F.2d 1126, 1139–40 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 102. Patel, 61 F.3d at 142. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (―[T]he court 
in its discretion orders . . . [defendant] permanently and unconditionally prohibited from 
acting as an officer or director.‖). 
 105. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 305(a)(1), 116 Stat. 745, 
778–79 (2002) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)). 
 106. SEC v. Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Patel, 61 F.3d at 140–41 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (1990))) (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 27 (2002), 2002 WL 1443523). 
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continued to use pre-Sarbanes-Oxley standards and no court addressed the 
reduction in the SEC‘s burden of persuasion.108 
3.   Articulating ―Unfitness‖ in SEC v. Levine 
In SEC v. Levine, a court explicitly addressed the Sarbanes-Oxley 
statutory amendment.109  The case involved two defendants who made false 
statements in connection with public filings and enriched themselves 
through the sale of their holdings in the artificially inflated stock.110  The 
court noted that the post-Sarbanes-Oxley standard for granting an officer or 
director bar was a ―question of first impression in the federal courts‖ 
because no other court had addressed the statutory amendment.111  The 
court held that the proper rubric for determining ―unfitness‖ should be a 
―holistic determination‖ involving the use of nine nonexhaustive factors: 
(1) the nature and complexity of the scheme; (2) the defendant‘s role in 
the scheme; (3) the use of corporate resources in executing the scheme; 
(4) the defendant‘s financial gain (or loss avoidance) from the scheme; 
(5) the loss to investors and others as a result of the scheme; (6) whether 
the scheme represents an isolated occurrence or a pattern of misconduct; 
(7) the defendant‘s use of stealth and concealment; (8) the defendant‘s 
history of business and related misconduct; and (9) the defendant‘s 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing and the credibility of his contrition.112 
The Levine court used these nine factors to grant a ten-year bar against 
the defendants.113  The court ultimately granted the bar despite the fact that, 
in its assessment, only six of the nine factors weighed in favor of a 
determination of ―unfitness.‖114  The court suggested that in light of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the ―unfitness‖ language merited a new standard in 
place of the Patel factors.115  Nevertheless, the court still considered the 
Patel factors after its own nine-factor test and concluded that the 
―[d]efendants‘ conduct clearly meets four out of the six.‖116  The court then, 
―[d]rawing from pre-Sarbanes-Oxley precedent,‖ considered whether a 
conditional, time- or industry-limited bar might be appropriate.117  The 
court‘s decision not to grant a permanent bar hinged on a ―finding that the 
Levines are unfit to serve as officers and/or directors of public companies, 
 
 108. See, e.g., SEC v. Patterson, No. 03 Civ. 0302 (CVE) (PJC), 2006 WL 770626, at *3 
(N.D. Okla. Mar. 23, 2006); SEC v. Save The World Air, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11586 (GBD) 
(FM), 2005 WL 3077514, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005); SEC v. Global Telecom Servs., 
L.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 2d 94, 121 (D. Conn. 2004). 
 109. SEC v. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 121, 144 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 110. Id. at 128. 
 111. Id. at 145. 
 112. Id.  The Levine court borrowed heavily from another article by Jayne Barnard. See 
infra Part II.C.1. 
 113. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 146. 
 114. Id. at 145–46. 
 115. Id. at 146. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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notwithstanding their status as first-time offenders,‖ but the court concluded 
that ―[a] shorter ban is an appropriate remedy.‖118 
Even after Levine finally addressed the change in language, numerous 
courts continued to adopt or maintain the use of the Patel factors after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.119  It was not until May 2013 that a federal court 
explicitly addressed the appropriateness of the Patel factors in a post-
Sarbanes-Oxley regime.120  In SEC v. Bankosky,121 the Second Circuit 
acknowledged the Sarbanes-Oxley statutory amendment, and ruled that the 
change in the statute‘s language ―did not undermine the usefulness of the 
Patel factors.‖122 
D.   Other Civil Remedies Dealing with Similar Misconduct 
Officer and director bars are an important civil remedy for the SEC, yet 
other important civil and criminal penalties exist for violators of federal 
securities laws.  This section will provide an overview of other civil and 
criminal remedies against officers, directors, and other professionals who 
violate federal securities laws or professional standards of conduct.  These 
examples are provided to show how other remedies differ in rationale and 
source from officer and director bars. 
1.   Other SEC Bars and Censures 
In addition to its authority to bar individuals from serving as officers or 
directors, the Commission also has the power to censure certain licensed 
professionals and prevent them from practicing before it, pursuant to SEC 
Rule 102(e).123  Rule 102(e) sanctions may be imposed for remedial 
purposes but not for punishment.124 
The Commission uses its authority under Rule 102(e) most frequently to 
sanction attorneys and accountants if they lack requisite qualifications, 
character, integrity, have engaged in unethical or other improper 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. See, e.g., SEC v. Resnick, 604 F. Supp. 2d 773, 783–84 (D. Md. 2009) (applying 
Patel to permanently bar a director who participated in a fraudulent scheme to overstate 
financial results). 
 120. SEC v. Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 121. 716 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 122. Id.; see also SEC v. Gupta, No. 11 Civ. 7566 (JSR), 2013 WL 3784138, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013) (―Despite [the lower Sarbanes-Oxley standard], courts in this 
Circuit have typically applied a pre-Sarbanes-Oxley list of six non-exhaustive factors to aid 
their determination of the propriety of an officer-director bar.‖). 
 123. Rule 102(e) provides: 
The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily or permanently, the 
privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is 
found . . . :  (i) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or (ii) 
To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper 
professional conduct; or (iii) To have willfully violated, or willfully aided and 
abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and 
regulations thereunder. 
17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1) (2012). 
 124. McCurdy v. SEC, 396 F.3d 1258, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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professional conduct, or have violated federal securities laws.125  When 
barring attorneys, courts will rule in favor of the SEC if they find that the 
attorney violated professional rules of practice promulgated by either the 
Commission or a state bar association.126  With respect to accountants, Rule 
102(e) defines three classes of ―improper professional conduct‖ that will 
result in a censure: 
(1) Intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct, that 
results in a violation of applicable professional standards; (2) A single 
instance of highly unreasonable conduct that results in a violation of 
applicable professional standards; and (3) Repeated instances of 
unreasonable conduct, each resulting in a violation of applicable 
professional standards, that indicate a lack of competence to practice 
before the Commission.127 
An accountant‘s ―applicable professional standards‖ include both 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS).128  Ultimately, a court‘s decision to 
censure attorneys and accountants from practicing before the SEC stems 
from violations of that professional‘s relevant standards of conduct.129 
2.   Censures Beyond the SEC 
Outside the Commission, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority130 
(FINRA) has the authority under Section 15(A) of the Exchange Act to 
permanently bar individuals from the securities industry for violating its 
codes of conduct, federal securities laws, or SEC rules.131  FINRA hearing 
 
 125. J. William Hicks, 17 CIVIL LIABILITIES:  ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION UNDER THE 
1933 ACT § 2:115 (2011); see also Altman v. SEC, 687 F.3d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(sanctioning attorney); McCurdy, 396 F.3d at 1264 (affirming one-year sanction against 
accountant). 
 126. See Altman v. SEC, 768 F. Supp. 2d 554, 557–58 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 687 F.3d 
44 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 127. Dearlove v. SEC, 573 F.3d 801, 803–04 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting 17 C.F.R. 
§ 201.102(e)(1)(iv)(A), (B)(1)–(2)). 
 128. Id. at 804.  GAAP, published by the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 
are the country‘s accounting rules and prescribe how transactions are recorded in an entity‘s 
books and records. Id.  GAAS are ―‗approved and adopted by the membership of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [(AICPA)],‘ and concern ‗the quality of 
the performance . . . [and] the judgment exercised by‘ an auditor.‖ Id.  Such standards also 
prescribe specific auditor responsibilities, which include maintaining independence in fact 
and in appearance from the company under audit; properly planning, supervising, and 
performing an audit; and gathering sufficient evidence and preparing sufficient 
documentation of procedures performed and the auditor‘s conclusions. Id. 
 129. McCurdy, 396 F.3d at 1264 (upholding the Commission‘s finding of reckless 
behavior that merited a one-year bar based on defendant‘s lack of skepticism relating to a 
suspicious receivable in the accounting records of his audit client). 
 130. FINRA is a self-regulatory organization of national securities associations that are 
registered to the SEC.  It is responsible for ―conducting investigations and commencing 
disciplinary proceedings against [FINRA] member firms and their associated member 
representatives relating to compliance with the federal securities laws and regulations.‖  
Fiero v. FINRA, 660 F.3d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. 
NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 131. See Fiero, 660 F.3d at 574. 
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panel decisions are appealed to the FINRA National Adjudicatory Council 
(NAC), which can affirm, modify, or reverse.132  NAC decisions can then 
be appealed to the SEC and, subsequently, to the United States Courts of 
Appeal.133 
E.   White Collar Criminal Penalties and Offenses 
The SEC maintains jurisdiction over securing civil injunctive penalties, 
including officer and director bars, while criminal authorities maintain 
separate investigation and prosecutorial jurisdiction over violations of 
federal securities law.134  Though Patel and Levine address officer and 
director bars as a civil remedy, criminal penalties are also available when a 
criminal authority prosecutes a defendant for a securities law violation.  
Recognizing that civil and criminal sanctions have different policy 
justifications, the Supreme Court upheld Congress‘s ability to authorize 
both civil and criminal sanctions against the same defendant for the same 
misconduct.135  Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress strengthened both 
civil and criminal penalties against securities fraud violators.136  In the 
statute, Congress called for the U.S. Sentencing Commission to promulgate 
guidelines that ―reflect the serious nature of the [criminal] offenses and 
penalties set forth,‖ in order to ―deter, prevent, and punish such 
offenses.‖137  Conversely, Congress never mentioned punishment in the 
context of officer and director bars or other civil remedies.138 
Though civil and criminal penalties operate concurrently under different 
policy justifications, they call for examining similar defendant misconduct 
when determining liability.  For example, federal criminal sentencing 
guidelines consider some of the same factors used in Patel and Levine, such 
as whether an individual is an organizer or has a central role in a scheme to 
defraud.139 
 
 132. Id. at 572. 
 133. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(d), 78(y) (2012)). 
 134. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 135. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151–52 (1956) (holding criminal and 
civil penalties for the same act of omission was not a violation of double jeopardy as long as 
congressional intent was not to punish twice); see also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 
103 (1997) (disagreeing with petitioner‘s argument that civil disbarment and monetary 
penalties precluded criminal prosecution and holding penalties were civil in nature, thus not 
amounting to a double-jeopardy violation). 
 136. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, 26 
SECURITIES LITIGATION DAMAGES § 5A:25 (2006) (discussing increases in criminal penalties, 
such as maximum imprisonment for financial statement fraud). 
 137. KAUFMAN, supra note 136, § 5A:25 (quoting Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-204 §§ 905(b)(1), 1104(b)(1)) (emphasis added). 
 138. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 
1394–96, 1990 WL 256464. 
 139. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2006) (examining 
whether a defendant plays an ―aggravating role‖ in determining whether additional levels 
should be added to the base sentencing guidelines), with SEC v. Abellan, 674 F. Supp. 2d 
1213, 1220–21 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (granting a permanent officer and director bar against a 
defendant who ―led a sophisticated scheme‖ to defraud). 
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II.   A WORKABLE STANDARD?  PATEL AND LEVINE STRUGGLE TO ADAPT 
As Patel and Levine have made clear, courts enjoy wide discretion in 
making an unfitness determination.  This judicial discretion opens the door 
for inconsistent results for different defendants.  Part II.A begins by 
exploring two defendants who ultimately faced officer and director bars.  
The juxtaposition shows how the existing standards permit unpredictable 
results due to the discretion granted in Patel and Levine.  Part II.B explores 
how courts prevent the Commission from achieving uniform penalties 
across similar levels of misconduct by weighing factors inconsistently.  Part 
II.C highlights inconsistent responses to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act‘s statutory 
amendment.  While many scholars have called for stronger remedies, courts 
have largely disregarded the statutory change.  This disparity has resulted in 
the SEC frequently arguing for a permanent ban, while defendants 
frequently argue for no ban at all, across a wide variety of misconduct.  Part 
II.D highlights how judicial discretion granted by Patel and Levine has 
made it difficult for the Commission to efficiently deter misconduct, 
evidenced by the recent financial crisis and a persistent lack of investor 
confidence in corporate governance. 
A.   A Tale of Two Officers 
This section discusses two cases involving officer and director bars to 
highlight the inconsistencies that may arise if a court applies Patel or 
Levine. 
Charles C. Conaway was hired as the Chairman and CEO of Kmart in 
2000.140  On January 22, 2002, Kmart filed for bankruptcy.141  Amid 
Kmart‘s financial turmoil, Conaway departed as Chairman and, in March 
2002, he finalized a separation agreement as CEO.142  Despite Kmart‘s poor 
financial performance, Kmart‘s Board of Directors had no reason to 
specifically fault Conaway and thus did not dismiss him ―for cause.‖143  
The board retained outside counsel to conduct an investigation into the 
cause of Kmart‘s poor financial performance.144 
Later that year, the investigators reported their findings to the board,145 
which revealed that Conaway had been aware of, and had deliberately 
concealed, material adverse information from the board and the public.146  
The investigators also found that if the board ―had been given all of the 
relevant information,‖ it could have taken action to prevent the 
bankruptcy.‖147 
 
 140. A Look Back at Some Major CEO Flameouts, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/look-back-some-major-ceo-flameouts. 
 141. SEC v. Conaway, 697 F. Supp. 2d 733, 737 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 738. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 739. 
 147. Id. 
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At trial, a jury found that Conaway had knowingly misrepresented to the 
board Kmart‘s ability to pay its suppliers throughout the fall of 2001.148  
Conaway had implemented a system at Kmart that deliberately slowed 
down payments to vendors, and he had failed to inform the board of the 
impending ―cash crisis.‖149  In October 2001, the program he implemented 
delayed a total of $982 million in vendor payments, while he personally 
represented to the board that Kmart had an improved $158 million 
―liquidity cushion.‖150  In November, he told members of the board that the 
delayed payments were the result of an ―IT system glitch.‖151  Following a 
New York Times article that questioned ―Kmart‘s ability to pay off the 
money it owes,‖152 Conaway responded, ―Kmart is not short of cash.‖153  
Kmart CFO Jeffrey N. Boyer suggested, upon review of the company‘s 
accounting policies for its vendor payments, that Kmart might need to file 
for bankruptcy, and he was fired by Conaway shortly thereafter.154  The 
court further found that Conaway had lied about discussing the possibility 
of bankruptcy in a meeting that occurred shortly before Conaway fired 
Boyer.155 
Ultimately, the court found Conaway was ―deceptive at trial‖ and 
―lied . . . repeatedly‖ regarding the source of the delays in vendor 
payments.156  The court concluded Conaway had played a ―central role‖ in 
securities fraud violations due to material misstatements and omissions in a 
November 27, 2001 Kmart public filing by manipulating Kmart‘s true 
financial picture.157  Kmart‘s stock price dropped significantly following 
public disclosure of the bankruptcy.158 
In January 2008, Brent C. Bankosky was hired as a director of Global 
Licensing and Business Development for Takeda Pharmaceuticals 
International Inc. (Takeda), a pharmaceutical manufacturer and was later 
promoted to a senior director role.159  Bankosky learned material, nonpublic 
information regarding the company‘s mergers, strategic alliances, 
acquisitions, and other projects in his role at Takeda.160  Based on this 
inside information, Bankosky illegally purchased securities that he knew 
would appreciate significantly in value once certain deals were publically 
 
 148. Id. at 754. 
 149. Id. at 752–53. 
 150. Id. at 753. 
 151. Id. at 754. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 754–55. 
 155. Id. at 756. 
 156. Id. at 763, 765. 
 157. Id. at 771, 773. 
 158. Joel Groover, Kmart’s Stock Price Rebounds as Its Restructuring Efforts Gain Favor 
with Wall Street, NAT‘L REAL ESTATE INVESTOR (Jan. 30, 2002), http://nreionline.com/news/ 
kmart-s-stock-price-rebounds-its-restructuring-efforts-gain-favor-wall-street. 
 159. SEC v. Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45, 46 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 160. Id. 
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announced.161  As a result of his trading, Bankosky netted an illegal gain of 
$63,000 on an initial investment of $37,500 for a total return of 169 
percent.162  After this trade, Bankosky again traded in two other 
pharmaceutical companies‘ shares, both of which were engaged in merger 
talks with Takeda.163  In total, Bankosky made thirteen distinct illegal 
trades spanning two years.164 
Each of these directors broke the law and violated duties to his respective 
employer and its shareholders.  For his actions in netting a $63,000 personal 
gain, the court barred Bankosky from serving as an officer or director of a 
public company for ten years.165  In contrast, although Conaway defrauded 
investors, and his actions contributed to the bankruptcy of a national 
retailer, the court did not bar him in any way from officer or director 
service.166 
B.   Opportunities for Inconsistent Application 
Part II.B of this Note examines the current legal standard that gives 
judges the ―substantial discretion‖ that contributed to the divergent results 
in SEC v. Conaway167 and SEC v. Bankosky.168  This discretion includes the 
authority to grant a bar that is permanent or limited in duration or scope.169 
The court in Patel proposed a nonexhaustive factor-based standard for 
determining whether to grant an officer or director bar.170  However, while 
it called on courts to articulate why they issued the type of bar they did, it 
failed to articulate how courts should do so.171  Likewise, there exists no 
bright-line test for assessing whether misconduct, if it does rise to 
―unfitness,‖ merits an unconditional bar or one limited in time or scope.172 
As a result, courts purporting to apply Patel or Levine have reached 
vastly different results using a variety of analyses.173 
 
 161. See id.  Federal securities law prohibits insider trading on the basis of material, 
nonpublic information as a violation of Rule 10b-5. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653–54 
(1983). 
 162. SEC v. Bankosky, No. 12 Civ. 1012 (HB), 2012 WL 1849000, at *1 (S.D.N.Y May 
21, 2012), aff’d, 716 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at *2. 
 165. SEC v. Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45, 46–47, 50 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 166. SEC v. Conaway, 697 F. Supp. 2d 733, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
 167. 697 F. Supp. 2d 733 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
 168. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995).  For example, compare Conaway, 697 
F. Supp. 2d at 773 (granting no bar), with Bankosky, 716 F.3d at 50 (granting a ten-year bar). 
 169. Patel, 61 F.3d at 141. 
 170. See id. at 140–42. 
 171. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, e.g., SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (barring a 
defendant ―permanently and unconditionally‖ from officer or director service for simply 
―demonstrat[ing] unfitness‖ without an articulated, formal analysis). 
 173. See SEC v. Boey, No. 07 Civ. 39 (SM), 2013 WL 3805127, at *3 (D.N.H. July 22, 
2013) (considering a first-time offender status to merit a five-year bar (citing SEC v. Chester 
Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 530 (D.N.J. 1999))); SEC v. Gupta, No. 11 Civ. 7566 
(JSR), 2013 WL 3784138, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2013) (applying Patel factors to grant a 
permanent associational bar); SEC v. Bankosky, No. 12 Civ. 1012 (HB), 2012 WL 1849000, 
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Courts also employ their discretion to consider factors that are less 
directly related to a defendant‘s misconduct.  One such consideration is 
when a court evaluates a period of time subsequent to a defendant‘s 
misconduct when the defendant is unable to secure employment, which this 
Note refers to as effective service.174  In SEC v. Miller,175 the court 
determined that the defendant‘s conduct merited a fifteen-year bar, yet the 
court granted a five-year bar, noting the defendant ―has not served in any 
responsible position in a publicly-traded corporation in the last 10+ years‖ 
and considered the ten years the defendant had not been employed to 
constitute ―effective[] serv[ice].‖176  Similarly, the court held in SEC v. 
Jasper177 that the defendant‘s conduct merited a five-year bar, but because 
he had already been ―effectively barred from his profession for three and a 
half years,‖ the court granted a bar for only two years.178  In Conaway, in 
declining to grant a bar, the court considered the defendant‘s reputational 
damage in determining there was no ―realistic likelihood‖ in the future that 
Conaway would ―be hired to serve as an office[r] or director of a publically 
traded corporation.‖179 
Conaway also considered whether, in light of other penalties, an officer 
and director bar might be a duplicate and unnecessary punishment.180  The 
court referred to Conaway‘s ―disgorgement and the penalty‖ as specifically 
mitigating the need for an officer and director bar.181 
The SEC also has employed its own discretion in choosing the nature and 
extent of the bar it seeks.182  Faced with a wide variety of results, the SEC 
has frequently sought a permanent bar against a defendant whenever it tries 
to secure an officer and director bar, irrespective of a defendant‘s level of 
conduct. 
 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2012) (granting ten-year bar); SEC v. Jasper, 883 F. Supp. 2d 915, 
934 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (considering Patel and Levine and granting a two-year bar); SEC v. 
Selden, 632 F. Supp. 2d 91, 100 (D. Mass. 2009) (applying Patel factors to grant a two-year 
bar). 
 174. See, e.g., SEC v. Miller, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 175. 744 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 176. Id. But see SEC v. Capital Solutions Monthly Income Fund, LP, No. 10 Civ. 3995 
(DWF) (JJK), 2014 WL 2922644, at *6 & n.3 (D. Minn. June 27, 2014) (granting a 
permanent bar despite the defendant‘s assertion he would never seek employment as an 
officer or director again). 
 177. 883 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 178. Jasper, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 931. 
 179. SEC v. Conaway, 697 F. Supp. 2d 733, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2010).  The court declined 
to outline any specific metric used to determine ―likelihood‖ of future employment or 
whether the defendant had made any actual efforts to secure employment. Id. 
 180. Id.  The court referred to the disgorgement and penalty as teaching the defendant a 
―lesson . . . learned.‖ Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint at 3, SEC v. Berry, 580 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008) (No. 07 Civ. 04431 (RMW)) (seeking a permanent officer and director bar for 
accounting fraud). 
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In one case, the SEC sought a permanent officer and director bar against 
an insider trading tippee, and the court refused to grant a bar altogether.183  
In another, the Commission sought a permanent bar against an executive for 
backdating stock options, and the court granted a two-year bar.184  In a third 
example, the SEC sought a permanent officer and director bar against a 
CEO and chairman who employed incorrect revenue recognition and other 
accounting principles and made materially false statements regarding his 
company‘s financial position in numerous press releases and SEC filings.185  
The court granted the permanent bar, even though the defendant had already 
been found guilty in a criminal proceeding and received a custodial 
sentence of thirty-six months, as well as criminal monetary penalties.186  
Despite wide variance in these defendants‘ misconduct, the SEC sought an 
identical, permanent bar in each case. 
Conversely, in a case where a defendant sold his company‘s stock while 
he was aware of material, nonpublic information regarding the company‘s 
clinical trials and the result of its FDA applications, the Commission noted 
it was his ―first and only violation of securities laws‖ and instead sought a 
five-year bar.187  Despite suggesting the defendant‘s actions were 
―particularly serious,‖ the court granted a two-year bar.188 
Defendants, likewise, frequently argue there should be no bar, 
irrespective of the defendant‘s level of conduct.189 
C.   Responding to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
As Part II.B demonstrated above, courts have employed wide latitude in 
their respective determinations of unfitness, leading to inconsistent results.  
Notwithstanding these divergent results, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also 
impacts how courts should apply the bar, since it recast the standard of 
which behavior even merits a bar.  Part II.C.1 explores how scholars 
recommended the court refine its analysis in light of the change from 
―substantial unfitness‖ to ―unfitness.‖  Part II.C.2 examines the 
Commission‘s response:  use of Patel and Levine is rendered inapposite in 
light of Congress‘s intent to lower the threshold of misconduct and to use 
the remedy to deter bad acts, not punish bad actors. 
 
 183. See SEC v. Pardue, 367 F. Supp. 2d 773, 777 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (declining to grant a 
bar where evidence presented an ―isolated incident‖ and where defendant had ―capitalized 
more on his family connections . . . than on his status as a former executive vice president‖). 
 184. SEC v. Jasper, 883 F. Supp. 2d 915, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 185. SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 186. Id. at 1080, 1086. 
 187. See SEC v. Selden, 632 F. Supp. 2d. 91, 98 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 188. Id. at 97. 
 189. See, e.g., SEC v. Miller, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (granting a 
five-year bar, though the defendant denied wrongdoing, arguing against an officer and 
director bar); Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 12–13, SEC v. Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45 
(2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12 Civ. 2943) (upholding district court‘s ten-year officer and director 
bar). 
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1.   Scholarly and Judicial Response 
This section examines how scholars responded to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the degree of impact that the amended statute should have on the 
legal standard for granting a bar. 
One proposed approach was to promulgate a standard in federal court 
that has a lower threshold than Barnard‘s six-factor test (adopted in Patel) 
and is more stringent than a ―mere violation of one of the scienter-based 
fraud provisions of the securities laws.‖190  This approach developed from a 
review of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act‘s legislative history, which concluded 
that the prior standard was ―inordinately high.‖191 
Barnard likewise revisited her discussion of officer and director 
unfitness.192  Through an examination of misconduct rooted in bankruptcy 
law, employment law, banking law, and securities law, she articulated that 
common themes of unfit conduct include:  ―misuse of corporate resources; 
affirmative misrepresentations; stealth and concealment; arrogance or 
grandiosity; personal enrichment; and lack of contrition.‖193  She proposed 
the new, nine-factor test that Levine ultimately adopted.194 
Barnard further examined a defendant‘s contrition.195  Relying on the 
expertise of remorse as a ―concept familiar to federal district judges,‖ she 
concluded that, as part of a moral judgment, judges ought to temper their 
finding of unfitness for genuinely contrite defendants.196  Barnard 
supported her argument by analyzing previous civil and criminal cases 
where judges had ―rewarded‖ defendants for their showing of remorse.197 
Another response suggested that it becomes problematic for reviewing 
courts and the public when a court attempts to skirt the ―unfitness‖ 
distinction altogether by failing to articulate its reasoning for granting a 
permanent or conditional bar.198  When courts fail to explain any reason at 
all why a defendant merits a bar, they fail to meet Congress‘s intent, which 
requires an articulated finding of ―unfitness.‖199 
 
 190. Michael Dailey, Officer and Director Bars:  Who Is Substantially Unfit to Serve 
After Sarbanes-Oxley?, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 837, 853 (2003). 
 191. Id. at 852 (citing S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 27 (2002)). 
 192. See Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10b-5 and the “Unfitness” Question, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 9 
(2005). 
 193. Id. at 27. 
 194. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 195. Barnard, supra note 192, at 52–53. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 52 (finding that the appropriate civil penalty for a defendant demonstrating 
―substantial and meaningful contrition‖ should be ―zero‖ (citing SEC v. Inorganic Recycling 
Corp., No. 99 Civ. 10159 (GEL), 2002 WL 1968341, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002))); see 
also United States v. Weeks, No. 00 Cr. 91-21 (RWS), 2003 WL 22671543, at *15 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2003) (stating that defendant‘s ―recognition of responsibility‖ for his 
misconduct reduces criminal sentence base offense level). 
 198. Jon Carlson, Securities Fraud, Officer and Director Bars, and the “Unfitness” 
Inquiry After Sarbanes-Oxley, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 679, 698 (2009) (citing SEC 
v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). 
 199. Id. 
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2.   The SEC‘s Response 
The Commission viewed the lowering of the standard from ―substantial 
unfitness‖ to ―unfitness‖ as an opportunity to develop a new legal 
framework that would lower its burden in obtaining a bar.  The question 
before the Second Circuit in SEC v. Bankosky was whether the district court 
had abused its discretion in adopting the Patel factors, in light of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley statutory change.200  The SEC argued that the Patel factors, 
despite granting some judicial discretion, were too rigid to permit courts to 
fully accommodate the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.201  The SEC also argued that 
Levine was inconsistent with the legislative history of the Remedies Act and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.202 
The Commission further contended that under the Levine standard, it 
would be difficult or impossible for a first-time offender to ever be subject 
to a ―permanent or substantial bar.‖203  The SEC argued that the Levine test 
restricts the use of the bar by considering factors outside the speculation of 
Congress when it passed the Remedies Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.204  
―[U]nless his ‗fraud has been outside the heartland of conventional frauds, 
either because of its magnitude or its impact on investors, in which he has 
been the driving and organizing force,‘‖ the SEC argued, no offender could 
ever be subject to an officer or director bar.205 
Therefore, the Commission claimed that a scheme like insider trading 
would rarely result in a court issuing an officer or director bar since insider 
trading is not recognized to be outside the specter of traditional frauds.206  
Unlike a complex scheme to defraud, insider trading typically does not 
involve a number of coconspirators under the guidance of a ―kingpin‖ 
organizing force.207  Yet, Congress included in the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act an explicit finding that ―federal statutes 
and Commission rules directed at the suppression of insider trading ‗are 
necessary and appropriate in the public interest‘‖ to protect investors.208  
The Commission argued that any rubric that excluded from its scope the 
significant investor harms from insider trading was too narrow and failed to 
consider Congress‘s intent when granting the SEC authority to deter such 
bad acts in the first place.209 
 
 200. SEC v. Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2013) (granting a ten-year bar relying on 
Patel). 
 201. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 49–50, Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45 (No. 12 Civ. 2943). 
 202. Id. at 51. 
 203. Id. at 52. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. (quoting Barnard, supra note 192, at 54–55) (emphasis added). 
 206. Id. at 53. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1(a) (2012)).  It is commonly understood that investor 
loss occurs due to insider trading when the material nonpublic information that was traded 
upon would have caused a reasonable investor to act differently in making an investment 
decision. Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Cont‘l Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 560 (N.D. 
Ill. 1972). 
 209. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 53, Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45 (No. 12 Civ. 2943). 
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Further, the Commission argued that both Levine and Patel rely 
inappropriately on criminal law theories.210  By applying concepts such as a 
―kingpin‖-style organizing force and a ―repeat offender,‖ which trace their 
roots to criminal law sentence enhancements, sentences are ―backward 
looking‖ because they punish certain criminals more harshly than others for 
their central role in criminal activity.211  Conversely, in the Remedies Act, 
Congress intended general deterrence that was ―remedial‖ and ―forward 
looking,‖ meant to protect investors against future misconduct.212 
Instead, the Commission argued, the court should consider the following 
five nonexclusive factors when determining whether to issue a permanent 
officer and director bar: 
[(1)] the fact that defendant has been found liable for illegal conduct; [(2)] 
the degree of scienter involved; [(3)] whether the infraction is an isolated 
occurrence; [(4)] whether defendant continues to maintain that his past 
conduct was blameless; and [(5)] whether, because of his professional 
occupation, the defendant might be in a position where future violations 
could be anticipated.213 
The key distinction between these factors and those adopted by the court 
in Patel is that Patel focuses on, almost ―dispositively,‖ whether a 
defendant had been found in past proceedings to have committed a 
violation.214  The standard does not assess whether the particular facts of 
the defendant‘s conduct suggested a potential for future misconduct.215  The 
ultimate thrust of the Commission‘s argument was that, in a quest to define 
unfitness, the Patel and Levine factors became consumed with a searching 
analysis of past repetitious behavior, when the Remedies Act‘s legislative 
history showed that the concern for investor protection was rooted in 
deterrence of future misconduct.216 
D.   Responding to the Financial Crisis of 2008 
and Lingering Investor Misconduct 
Inconsistent applications and divergent responses to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act highlight the Commission‘s concerns with the Patel and Levine 
standards for determining unfitness.  Part II.D explores how this conflict 
impacted investor confidence in light of widespread management 
misconduct leading to the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
 210. Id. at 54. 
 211. Id. at 54–55. 
 212. Id. at 55. 
 213. Id. at 57 (quoting SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., 574 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 
1978)).  The defendant in Commonwealth received an employment bar as a result of his 
misconduct. Id.  This case was decided prior to the passage of the Remedies Act. See Berg, 
supra note 46, at 1875. 
 214. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 56, Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45 (No. 12 Civ. 2943). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. (quoting SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 
133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013)) (―In determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate, ‘[t]he 
critical question . . . is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be 
repeated.‘‖). 
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In 2008, the collapse of subprime lending led to a financial crisis that 
devastated the global economy.217  In testimony before Congress, then-SEC 
Chairman Christopher Cox admitted and acknowledged that regulatory 
failures exacerbated the extent and impact of the crisis.218  In the wake of 
its regulatory shortcomings, the Commission‘s Enforcement Division has 
taken an active role in deterrence by seeking, among other penalties, officer 
and director bars and by publicizing its success after winning them.219 
The SEC has successfully argued for officer and director bars against 
numerous defendants whose misconduct related to the financial crisis.  
Through settlements, it obtained a five-year bar against executives who 
made material misstatements to conceal American Home Mortgage‘s 
deteriorating condition related to the subprime crisis;220 a permanent bar 
against former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo for deliberately 
misleading investors about subprime risks in order to increase 
Countrywide‘s market share;221 six permanent officer and director bars of 
former Brooke Corporation executives for making misleading and 
fraudulent statements to conceal the firm‘s deteriorating loan portfolio;222 
and a permanent bar against two Tier One bank executives for deliberately 
understating losses and misleading investors and regulators,223 among 
others.  The SEC also won a five-year officer and director bar in an 
administrative proceeding against a former Evergreen lead fund portfolio 
manager for her role in improperly valuing assets impaired by the subprime 
crisis.224 
Despite the Commission‘s successes, some practitioners have argued that 
the gradual shift in ―recent years‖ has been away from granting officer and 
director bars.225  In a DLA Piper Securities Enforcement Alert, Luis R. 
Mejia and Grayson D. Stratton argued that a marked decrease in courts‘ 
 
 217. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
24, 2008, at B1. 
 218. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 27, 2008, at A1. 
 219. The Commission publishes Enforcement Action statistics, showing key metrics in its 
response to the financial crisis. SEC Enforcement Actions:  Addressing Misconduct That Led 
to the Financial Crisis, SEC (July 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-
fc.shtml. 
 220. SEC v. Strauss et al., SEC Litig. Release No. 21014 (S.D.N.Y., April 28, 2009) 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21014.htm. 
 221. Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC‘s Largest-Ever Penalty 
Against a Public Company‘s Senior Executive, SEC News Digest, 2010-196 (Oct. 18, 2010), 
2010 WL 4072707. 
 222. SEC v. Orr et al., SEC Litig. Release No. 21957 (D. Kan., May 4, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr21957.htm; SEC v. Orr et al., SEC Litig. 
Release No. 22089 (D. Kan., Sept. 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2011/lr22089.htm. 
 223. SEC Charges Bank Executives in Nebraska with Understating Losses During 
Financial Crisis, SEC (Sept. 25, 2012),  http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/ 
PressRelease/1365171484998#.U_Of3WPB1IE. 
 224. Lisa B. Primo, Exchange Act Release No. 476, 2012 WL 6705813, at *29 (ALJ Dec. 
26, 2012). 
 225. Luis R. Mejia & Grayson D. Stratton, Courts Continue to Limit Officer and Director 
Bars Sought by SEC, DLA PIPER (Mar. 24, 2010) (on file with Fordham Law Review). 
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willingness to grant officer and director bars (specifically, their refusal to do 
so in SEC v. Conaway), is evident of a recent trend against issuing 
permanent bars.226  Mejia and Stratton identified the difficulty the SEC 
faces to establish at trial that a first-time offender both acted with a high 
degree of scienter and has a propensity toward future wrongdoing.227 
Despite facing difficulty in the courts, the Commission has continued to 
pursue officer and director bars against individuals involved in the financial 
crisis.  At the end of fiscal year 2011, the SEC had successfully won 
twenty-four out of thirty-six total cases brought against officers and 
directors arising out of misconduct relating to the 2008 financial crisis, a 
success rate of 67 percent.228  The Commission reports that, as of July 24, 
2014, forty individuals had received officer and director bars, industry bars, 
or Commission suspensions through enforcement actions relating to the 
2008 mortgage crisis out of seventy total cases, a rate of 57 percent.229  The 
Commission does not publicly disclose the number of bars it seeks, the 
percentage of attempted bars that are successful, or the number of 
settlements that result in a bar. 
Though the SEC has imposed some monetary and injunctive penalties in 
an effort to deter corporate misconduct, investors remain generally 
distrustful of management.  As of 2012, 48 percent of investors had no 
confidence in the corporate management of public companies and 51 
percent had no confidence in the boards of directors of public companies.230  
Investors are likewise apprehensive about financial regulators:  50 percent 
of investors reported that they had no confidence in government regulators 
and oversight.231 
A 2012 survey showed that 81 percent of investors do not believe the 
government has done enough to deter wrongdoing on the corporate level.232  
Further, 64 percent believe that ―corporate misconduct‖ played a significant 
role in the creation of the economic crisis.233 
 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id.  This frustration was echoed in the SEC‘s Bankosky brief, giving, for example, 
reasons why the Levine standard made it difficult or impossible to argue for a bar for any 
―common‖ fraud scheme like insider trading, despite its clear danger to investors. See supra 
note 203 and accompanying text. 
 228. Brent R. Baker, D. Loren Washburn & Shannon K. Zollinger, Conduct-Based Bars 
and Injunctions in SEC Enforcement Proceedings, AM. BAR ASS‘N (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/securities/email/summer2012/summer2012
-0912-conduct-based-bars-injunctions-sec-enforcement-proceedings.html. 
 229. SEC, supra note 219. 
 230. The Center for Audit Quality (CAQ)’s Annual Main Street Investor Survey, 2013 
CTR. FOR AUDIT QUALITY 11, available at http://www.thecaq.org/docs/press-release-
attachments/2013mainstreetinvestorsurvey.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
 231. Id. 
 232. LABATON SUCHAROW LLP, 2012 ETHICS & ACTION SURVEY:  VOICES CARRY 1 
(2012), available at http://www.labaton.com/en/about/press/upload/Ethics-Action-II-Report-
Final.pdf. 
 233. Id. 
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III.   A RETURN TO DETERRENCE 
Part I of this Note introduces the Patel and Levine approaches for 
determining unfitness.  Part II shows how judicial deference in the standard 
creates the potential for inconsistent application, how scholars and the 
Commission argue the standard should change to reflect the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, and how widespread investor mistrust of corporate governance 
remains in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  Part III.A suggests 
three overarching shortcomings with the existing standard:  (1) courts 
inconsistently weigh certain ―intangible factors‖ which have little to do 
with deterrence of misconduct that threatens investor wealth, (2) the 
standard incorrectly relies too heavily on criminal law principles, and 
(3) the standard itself is too lenient in light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the 2008 financial crisis.  Part III.B then proposes a new standard that 
appropriately responds to the shortcomings identified in Part III.A by 
reducing judicial discretion, emphasizing forward-looking, general 
deterrence, and making the overall standard more stringent.  Part III.C then 
applies the new standard to the examples of Conaway and Bankosky and 
demonstrates how it garners a result more consistent with Congress‘s 
original intent. 
A.   Overarching Issues with the Patel and Levine Methodology 
Investors would rightly benefit from a revised standard that better serves 
Congress‘s intent to deter corporate misconduct.234  However, to refine the 
standard, it is first necessary to identify and understand the principal 
shortcomings in the current framework.235  The three critical mechanisms 
for improvement involve (1) reducing inconsistent results by preventing 
courts from considering certain individualized ―intangible‖ factors, which 
have little to do with deterring future misconduct; (2) reframing the 
standard so it focuses less on concepts such as punishment, which originate 
in criminal law and are inappropriate in the context of civil remedies; and 
(3) making the standard more stringent to appropriately reflect the statutory 
change in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and address widespread management 
misconduct during the 2008 financial crisis.236 
The following sections specifically articulate how each of these 
shortcomings can be addressed in a new unfitness standard.  First, by 
eliminating ―intangible factors‖ from judicial consideration, courts can 
reduce inconsistent results among defendants.  Second, by emphasizing 
forward-looking potential for recidivism instead of backward-looking 
behavior, courts can rightly emphasize deterrence instead of punishment.  
Third, by responding to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and recognizing the 
lingering lack of investor confidence in light of the financial crisis, courts 
can ensure that the bar more successfully deters future misconduct. 
 
 234. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 235. See infra Part III.A.1–3. 
 236. See infra Part III.A.1–3. 
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1.   Patel and Levine Consider Intangible Factors 
That Contribute to Inconsistent Results 
This section addresses the inconsistencies that arise when courts consider 
non-misconduct-based ―intangible‖ factors.  It argues how these 
inconsistencies undermine the use of officer and director bars to deter future 
misconduct. 
The source of the courts‘ substantial discretion in determining unfitness 
is likely traceable to the lack of a formalized benchmark for officer and 
director conduct, which exists for most professional practitioners.237  When 
an accountant commits misconduct, a reviewing court can evaluate her 
behavior against the benchmark of specific professional standards to 
determine whether to censure her pursuant to Rule 102(e).238  Likewise, an 
attorney can be barred if his conduct violates professional rules of legal 
practice.239  However, no consistent professional practice standards exist 
for officers and directors, beyond those conferred by their fiduciary 
duties.240  The absence of a benchmark makes it difficult for courts to 
translate misconduct into the ―unfitness‖ that ultimately merits a bar.241  
Courts have attempted to resolve the inherent complexities of assessing 
misconduct against a benchmark buried within the contours of corporate 
common law by developing a standard which gives them significant 
discretion.242  This standard, however, has allowed courts to consider some 
factors that have little to do with deterrence of future misconduct and results 
in inconsistent application of the bar.243 
An improved unfitness standard would remove from consideration 
certain ―intrinsic‖ factors that have little to do with the harmful misconduct 
Congress aimed to deter.244  These factors can include a defendant‘s 
reputational damage, effective service (whether a defendant has had trouble 
securing future employment), and whether a judge feels an individual 
―deserves‖ punishment or shows contrition to the court.245  If courts 
continue to weigh these factors, which have little to do with a defendant‘s 
underlying scheme to defraud, they undermine the ability to create clear 
standards indicating which level of misconduct merits which remedy.246  
Clearer standards could provide both the Commission and future defendants 
a benchmark from which each can rely in litigation or settlement actions.  
More importantly, considering these factors undermines the ability for 
officer and director bars to effectively deter potential future violators, since 
 
 237. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.D.1. 
 238. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
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decision to issue one type of bar instead of another. See supra notes 102–04. 
 242. See Partnoy, supra note 29, at 801. 
 243. See supra Part II.B. 
 244. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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they are applied inconsistently.247  This section addresses how 
consideration of effective service, reputational impact, and defendant 
―contrition‖ undercuts Congress‘s goal of deterrence in the use of the bar. 
a.   Effective Service, Reputational Impact, and Other Penalties 
Defendants often escape a bar because courts conclude that, despite their 
flagrant misconduct, defendants have already ―suffered‖ some form of 
effective bar or reputational impact.248  This consideration hinders the 
effectiveness of officer and director bars because it substitutes a necessary 
mechanism of deterrence with a court‘s finding that an individual 
defendant‘s personal situation merits ―leniency.‖249  Further, considering a 
defendant‘s personal issues in seeking employment due to reputational 
damage is ultimately rooted in the mindset of punishing a bad actor, not 
deterring a future bad act.250 
Marketplace considerations can significantly impact the length of a 
court‘s imposed bar.251  They also create perverse incentives—while some 
defendants might have legitimate trouble securing future employment, 
others could hypothetically circumvent a court‘s standard by simply not 
seeking employment and claiming ―difficulty‖ to the court.252  Potential 
defendants could also structure any future employment to bypass an officer 
role, so that they can later argue to the court that they had been ―effectively 
barred‖ for a period of time, reducing the length of a judicial bar.253  
Creative options that could circumvent a judicial bar that are unrelated to a 
defendant‘s fraudulent scheme undermine the bar‘s ability to properly 
deter.254 
Similarly, courts should disregard a defendant‘s additional civil or 
criminal penalties when making a bar determination.255  The ability of the 
officer and director bar to effectively deter investor-eroding misconduct is 
weakened when courts either decline to impose one or decide on a lesser 
one because of ―piling on‖ what they incorrectly view as a substitute 
penalty.256 
 
 247. See supra Part II.B. 
 248. See supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text. 
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 253. See supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 50–51, 174–79 and accompanying text. 
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Allowing a court to consider a defendant‘s criminal punishment in a bar 
imposition analysis is problematic for two reasons.  First, the decision to 
criminally prosecute an individual defendant is made by criminal authorities 
and has little to do with the Commission and its decision whether to pursue 
a civil remedy.257  Second, civil and criminal remedies have vastly different 
policy justifications that are not comparable substitutes for one another.258  
When Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it lowered the ―substantial 
unfitness‖ standard for civil remedies and charged the Sentencing 
Commission with promulgating stricter criminal penalties for white collar 
offenses.259  Courts undermine congressional intent for parallel remedies 
when they consider one as eliminating or reducing the need for the other.260  
Considering a defendant‘s other civil penalties is equally problematic.  
Pecuniary civil penalties, such as disgorgement, are meant to primarily 
restore losses, not deter future misconduct.261  For example, failing to grant 
a bar because a particular defendant faced a significant pecuniary civil 
remedy might help to restore losses but controverts Congress‘s attempt to 
create a valid deterrence mechanism. 
b.   Defendant “Contrition” 
The Levine factors include a defendant‘s contrition as the ninth 
consideration, and it was one of the main themes in Barnard‘s 2005 
analysis.262  She argued for considering contrition because officer and 
director bars involve a moral judgment and judges can parse out when a 
defendant has demonstrated legitimate remorse and justly reduce that 
defendant‘s sentence accordingly.263  Applying contrition is problematic for 
two reasons.  First, determining whether contrition is genuine or part of a 
skilled act is not an easy task.264  Second, reducing an individual‘s 
―sentence‖ for remorse is fundamentally rooted in criminal law and is 
inconsistent with the legislative history supporting the Remedies Act, which 
emphasized deterrence, not punishment.265 
While a genuinely contrite defendant is less likely to repeat his or her 
misconduct, contrition alone should not be a principal factor in weighing an 
officer and director bar.  First, expressing contrition could be a legal 
strategy and may not reflect the true state of mind of the defendant.266  
Take, for example, a defendant who argues against a bar because his 
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 260. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
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 262. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 263. See Barnard, supra note 192, at 52–53. 
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conduct was not egregious under Patel.267  He may genuinely feel remorse 
for his conduct, but he may be prevented from expressing it in court or to 
the Commission, since his legal defense is to argue that his conduct was not 
egregious misconduct in the first place.  Consider another defendant, whose 
actions were so egregious that he has no choice of arguing there was no 
misconduct, and so his last-chance legal strategy is to appear as remorseful 
as possible, whether or not he actually feels genuinely contrite.268 
This is not to say that state of mind is impossible to discern or irrelevant 
to the decision of whether to impose a bar.  A more impartial way to assess 
a defendant‘s state of mind with regard to his or her misconduct would be 
to focus on how the defendant‘s conduct itself evidenced his or her state of 
mind at the time of the scheme.  For example, a court could examine how 
elaborately a defendant uses stealth or concealment to perpetrate a fraud.  
Defendants who make extraordinary efforts in furtherance of their 
misconduct pose the greatest risk to shareholders if they are permitted to 
continue serving as an officer or director.269 
Recall, for example, the blatant disregard Conaway demonstrated toward 
the Kmart Board of Directors.270  His affirmative misrepresentations 
suggest that he is a much greater risk to investors than, for example, an 
individual whose insider trading does not involve lying in furtherance of the 
scheme itself.271  Here, any remorse a defendant like Conaway might 
demonstrate at trial is much less relevant to an unfitness determination than 
an examination of his conduct while he was Kmart CEO.272  What 
Congress sought to deter was the dangerous action that threatens investor 
wealth, not an unremorseful defendant at trial.273 
Therefore, in delineating a standard for determining what level of officer 
and director misconduct merits an injunctive bar, the key is to look at just 
that—the misconduct itself—and disregard conduct or remorse which 
occurred after the scheme itself, such as contrition at trial. 
Lastly, it is inapposite to consider a civil injunctive remedy as being 
rooted in moral decision making.  Barnard specifically relied upon United 
States v. Weeks,274 a criminal case, to make the argument that moral 
decision making is relevant to a judge‘s imposition of a civil remedy.275  
Civil penalties are inherently different from criminal penalties in that they 
are rooted in deterrence, not moral blame or punishment for a guilty 
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defendant.276  Congress was clear that its intent was to deter, not to punish, 
when it codified officer and director bars in the Remedies Act.277  In basing 
a decision in part on the emotional response of an individual defendant, a 
court inappropriately assumes that the officer and director bar is a criminal 
punishment and erodes the underlying purpose of the remedy. 
2.   Patel and Levine Emphasize Backward-Looking History 
over Forward-Looking Potential for Recidivism 
As the SEC highlighted in its brief before the Second Circuit in SEC v. 
Bankosky, a crucial inquiry in both the Patel and Levine analyses is a 
searching examination into a defendant‘s past violation of the securities 
laws.278  While discussion of past violations is relevant insofar as it relates 
to potential recidivism, the key danger the Remedies Act and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act sought to protect against is future misconduct.279  Requiring 
―past violations‖280 of securities laws to merit a permanent bar puts an 
unnecessary obstacle in the way of the court, which might otherwise 
conclude a defendant‘s conduct was so damaging he or she merits a 
permanent bar, even without a past violation.281 
In light of the forward-looking mindset courts should have when 
determining whether or not to issue an officer or director bar, it is especially 
problematic when courts decline to grant a bar in significant part because it 
is the defendant‘s first federal securities law violation.282  While an absence 
of past violations might bolster the argument that an individual defendant 
might be less likely to recidivate, it should not be dispositive. 
Lastly, a standard that is primarily backward-looking also draws concepts 
from criminal law and its fundamental purpose of punishing a bad actor.283  
The officer and director bar, and its enforcement by the SEC, is a civil 
remedy and plays an entirely different role by seeking to deter future 
misconduct in general.284  Courts risk blurring the fundamental line 
between civil and criminal remedies when they emphasize prior bad acts 
over the potential for future violations.285 
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3.   Patel and Levine Address Neither Legislative Enactments 
nor Investor Mistrust Following the 2008 Financial Crisis 
The third significant shortcoming with Patel and Levine is that they do 
not have a stringent enough standard to determine unfitness.  There are two 
reasons why the standard should be made more stringent and the 
Commission‘s burden lowered.  First, a decade after clear congressional 
intent in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act compelled courts to lower the threshold 
from which they grant officer and director bars, they have failed to do so 
and continue to apply an inappropriately higher standard.286  Second, 
widespread misconduct leading up to the 2008 financial crisis and lingering 
investor uncertainty suggest current standards are not serving the 
underlying purpose of the bar.287  Both a response to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and continued investor uncertainty support lowering the overall 
standard for the misconduct that merits a finding of unfitness. 
a.   Properly Addressing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Congress‘s unequivocal response to the accounting fraud crises that 
plagued the financial markets in 2000 and 2001 cannot be understated:  
facing widespread investor concern, Congress responded swiftly and 
decisively in passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.288  Congressional intent 
makes clear that the threshold for misconduct warranting a bar should be 
lowered.289 
It is a positive development that courts have recently started to 
acknowledge the lowering of the SEC‘s burden in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.290  Yet, it is problematic that even courts that do acknowledge the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act conclude it should have no impact on their analysis.291 
Despite the clear intent of Congress to lower the statutory threshold, the 
various multifactor rubrics that remain in use after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
permit judicial discretion to avoid granting a bar, even in cases of flagrant 
misconduct.292  Industry experts have recognized a ―lessening‖ potency of 
the bar in recent years,293 suggesting that courts ought to reexamine their 
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approach to determining unfitness.294  The statutory change and its 
legislative history support the SEC‘s efforts to lower the standard of 
imposing officer and director bars.295 
b.   Importance of Effectively Responding to the 2008 Financial Crisis 
The authority to seek officer and director bars is a ―potent weapon[] in 
the SEC‘s arsenal‖ from the point of view of potential defendants.296  It is 
problematic that in an environment of misconduct, which contributed to the 
2008 financial crisis, courts have become even more reluctant to grant 
officer and director bars.297  Current officer and director bar standards have 
failed to help curtail a lack of investor confidence in corporate 
governance.298  Half of American investors flatly conclude that the 
government‘s regulatory arm has not done enough to protect investors from 
management misconduct.299  Courts should recognize the SEC‘s position 
and lower the threshold of misconduct in light of the flagrant delinquency at 
the heart of the financial crisis.  While the Commission‘s overall success 
rate is publicly unknown, recent data suggests that the percentage of courts 
granting civil penalties against an officer or director has decreased.300 
There are two likely reasons for the decrease in penalties.  First, as 
experts have suggested, courts have been increasingly reluctant to issue 
officer and director bars.301  Second, viewing an increasingly hostile legal 
landscape toward granting officer and director bars, the SEC may be 
seeking bars less frequently as an enforcement mechanism.302  Whichever 
the case, it is troublesome that the potency of the officer and director bar 
has not tracked with its role as a crucial deterrence mechanism in light of 
the financial crisis. 
B.   A New Standard:  Bringing Patel and Levine 
into the Twenty-First Century 
Using the Patel and Levine frameworks as a starting point and refining 
them to remedy the three principal issues discussed above, this section 
proposes that courts consider the following factors when determining 
whether to grant an officer and director bar:  (1) whether the conduct is 
isolated or represents a pattern or recurrence; (2) the defendant‘s degree of 
scienter; (3) the defendant‘s gain/loss avoided through the scheme; (4) the 
current and potential future loss to investors as a result of the scheme; 
(5) the defendant‘s role in the scheme; and (6) considering the defendant‘s 
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professional occupation, whether the defendant is in a position to commit 
future violations.  Each of these factors should be seen as answering the 
ultimate inquiry:  how will use of the bar appropriately deter future 
misconduct that threatens investor confidence? 
1. Whether the Conduct Is Isolated or Recurring 
The standard first dispenses with consideration of ―egregiousness‖ as an 
intermediate step in determining unfitness.303  Courts should not be 
required to make a formal finding of egregiousness, as required by Patel, 
because courts have struggled to define what the term means in the context 
of officer and director misconduct.304  The term is also entirely absent from 
Section 21(d)(2).305  Further, courts struggling to determine egregiousness 
have primarily relied on whether the scheme was isolated or recurring.306  
Instead of requiring this intermediate step, the new standard simply 
examines whether the scheme is isolated or recurring.307 
That a factor such as ―relying on the advice of counsel‖ could mitigate a 
finding of egregiousness but not preclude a finding of liability further 
complicates the standard.308  The standard is clouded if a court can find a 
defendant‘s behavior to not be ―egregious‖ but still find him liable.309  
There is no need to define misconduct with a vague word when it has, at 
best, a tenuous connection to actually granting a bar. 
A Senate Banking Committee report suggests that use of the word 
―egregious‖ was an attempt to define a line between issuing a permanent 
versus temporary bar.310  However, courts have failed to use egregiousness 
as a distinguishing factor when articulating whether to issue a permanent or 
time-limited bar.311  The proposed standard therefore eliminates the 
responsibility to classify behavior by an abstract concept when courts can 
instead derive unfitness from the nature of the defendant‘s scheme itself. 
Distinguishing a scheme between a one-time event and a pattern of 
explicit actions that repeatedly defrauded investors is also a critical 
examination that judges must make insofar as it is relevant to the potential 
for recidivism.  In the case of a recurring pattern of misconduct, courts have 
appropriately recognized that conduct spanning over a period of time poses 
a greater threat to investor capital and must be deterred more potently than a 
unique act.312  It is also important for courts to remember that misconduct 
spawning from a single isolated scheme to defraud should not prevent the 
court from granting a bar if the isolated conduct is severe enough to indicate 
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a potential for future misconduct.  Maintaining a rule that proscribes a 
permanent bar for first-time offenders (absent particular justification) may 
cause certain bad actors to justify misconduct on the basis that they have no 
prior history of securities fraud liability.313 
There is also some ambiguity as to whether a pattern of ―various 
deceptions and critical omissions‖ should be considered isolated or 
recurring.314  A single instance of insider trading can be reasonably 
classified as an isolated incident.  However, repeated false statements and 
assurances, even if part of a common scheme, should not be classified as 
―isolated.‖315  For example, compare a single instance of insider trading 
with Conaway, who lied over a period of four months, developed an IT 
system to falsely record vendor payments, lied repeatedly to the board of 
directors and the media, and fired a fellow executive who suggested that 
there was improper accounting.316  There is a clear distinction between this 
course of conduct and that of the defendant in SEC v. Dibella,317 who 
netted a personal gain of $121,000 through insider trading.318  In applying 
Patel, each defendant received the same result of no bar.  Continuous 
misconduct, even if in furtherance of a unified intent to deceive, should be 
recognized as recurring conduct and appropriately weigh more heavily in 
favor of a bar. 
The proposed standard further drops the requirement that a scheme be 
―outside‖ the specter of traditional frauds.319  A scheme such as insider 
trading, if as common as the Commission suggests, should be deterred even 
more strongly to prevent its recurrence, not less strongly as a Levine 
analysis would dictate. 
2.   Defendant‘s Degree of Scienter 
Scienter is required under the standard because it is a fundamental 
element of federal securities law violations.320  Further, Congress was 
explicit in legislating officer and director bars to protect the public from 
individuals who have demonstrated, through deliberate fraudulent 
misconduct, that they should not be entrusted with investor funds.321  
Therefore, it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the bar for a court to 
impose a bar against an individual who failed to display ―an intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.‖322 
The proposed standard recognizes that a first-time offender can be just as 
likely to demonstrate the requisite level of scienter as a repeat offender.  If 
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conduct throughout a scheme is deliberate and recurring, a defendant‘s lack 
of prior violations should not be dispositive of the court‘s decision to issue 
a permanent officer or director bar.323  It is this significant hurdle that 
practitioners have identified as one of the single greatest burdens to the 
SEC‘s success in securing officer and director bars.324 
3.   Defendant‘s Gain/Loss Avoided 
Courts should examine the benefit the defendant gained or attempted to 
gain in furtherance of his scheme.  Patel and Levine consider purely 
―economic‖ gain or stake, which omits other forms of noneconomic gains a 
defendant could extract from a scheme of misconduct.325  Courts have 
rightly recognized that a defendant‘s personal monetary gain/loss avoided 
from his participation in a scheme to defraud should impact whether he 
receives an officer and director bar.326  However, requiring ―economic‖ 
gain is underinclusive because it fails to capture other types of gains that 
may motivate officer or director misconduct and fails to deter such acts, 
which may threaten investor wealth. 
Defendants may commit misconduct that threatens investor wealth and 
should be deterred even if the misconduct does not bring them direct and 
immediate economic or financial gain.327  Irrespective of that defendant‘s 
actual economic misappropriation from the scheme, the bar should be used 
to deter any such acts which threaten investor confidence. 
The proposed standard captures defendants who craft a scheme to avoid 
an immediate or cognizable gain. Courts applying Patel have found it ―far 
too draconian‖ to grant a permanent bar absent a concrete financial gain.328  
The proposed standard therefore implores courts to consider both monetary 
and nonmonetary gains or losses avoided when evaluating a defendant for 
unfitness.  Recognizing pecuniary and nonpecuniary gains also aligns 
officer and director bars closer to the standards used to establish Rule 10b-5 
liability for insider trading.329 
4.   Current and Potential Future Investor Losses 
This factor is similar to the third consideration but is focused less on the 
scheme‘s impact on the defendant and more on the investor.  In some cases, 
a defendant‘s gain may be quantifiable and investor loss may not be 
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quantifiable.330  The reverse may also be true, and a standard which 
effectively deters misconduct should capture both scenarios.331  Since the 
ultimate goal is to deter misconduct that threatens investor loss and erodes 
confidence in the market, it is necessary that the standard capture schemes 
in which either an investor‘s losses or a defendant‘s gain is readily 
quantifiable.  Ultimately, either type of misconduct should merit an officer 
and director bar to deter future similar behavior. 
5.   Defendant‘s Role in the Scheme 
The defendant‘s level of active participation in the scheme is an 
important factor insofar as it is indicative of future recidivism.  The closer a 
defendant was to the center of the scheme, the more likely she is to repeat 
the misconduct and merits an officer and director bar.332 
This factor also considers the defendant‘s role in the scheme as opposed 
to his formal position at the time of the misconduct.333  While a defendant‘s 
role as an officer or director while perpetrating a scheme could weigh in 
favor of imposing a bar, it should not be required.  Courts have been correct 
in eschewing a formalistic requirement that a defendant must occupy an 
officer or director position to merit a future bar. 
Considering a defendant‘s role in the scheme helps courts in deterring 
future misconduct, even if the defendant was not an officer or director at the 
time.  For example, in an insider trading scheme a tipper may make 
significant ill-gotten gains and be in a professional occupation posing risk 
of future violations.334  However, if that individual was not at the center of 
the scheme and was a tippee, barring her from serving as an officer or 
director would do little to deter tippers—those who orchestrate the scheme 
in the first place and pose the greatest risk to investor wealth.335 
6.   Professional Occupation Posing Risk of Future Violations 
A defendant‘s professional role might give him or her the opportunity to 
continue to misappropriate investor funds.  A permanent or extended time-
limited bar might be the only way to effectively deter such misconduct.  
This factor reflects the Commission‘s position that Patel and Levine 
overemphasize a defendant‘s historical conduct and position over the 
likelihood that a defendant will be in a position to commit misconduct in 
the future.336  Aligning the standard with potential for recidivism instead of 
an emphasis on past securities laws violations also eliminates consideration 
of criminal law concepts, which are inapposite to the civil remedy of an 
officer and director bar.337 
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C.   Applying the Standard:  Revisiting Conaway and Bankosky 
To demonstrate the use of the proposed standard, this section applies it to 
Conaway‘s and Bankosky‘s conduct in an effort to show how the standard 
of ―unfitness‖ garners a result that will better deter future misconduct. 
1.   Conaway 
The first factor of the new standard is whether the defendant‘s conduct is 
isolated or recurring.338  Conaway‘s conduct spanned throughout the fall of 
2001.339  Aware that Kmart was unable to meet its supplier obligations, he 
approved a confidential project which would delay vendor payments.340  He 
lied to the board, blaming the delayed payments on a systems glitch, and 
committed securities fraud by knowingly filing false financial 
statements.341  Under the proposed standard, this conduct, though a 
continuous single scheme to defraud with regards to Kmart‘s solvency, 
would represent recurring activity.  This factor would therefore weigh in 
favor of imposing an officer bar. 
The second factor is the defendant‘s degree of scienter.342  Conaway 
made repeated false statements regarding Kmart‘s cash position to the board 
of directors which he knew to be untrue.343  He also fired Kmart‘s CFO 
after the CFO suggested that Kmart reexamine its accounting policy.344  
The defendant‘s scienter also weighs in favor of imposing a bar. 
The third factor is the defendant‘s gain or loss avoided.345  Conaway did 
not directly profit from his involvement in the scheme.346  While it could be 
argued that he benefited as an officer of the company by obscuring its dire 
financial situation, it is not clear that had he disclosed Kmart‘s true 
financial state to the board, he would have been terminated ―for cause.‖347  
Because there is no direct financial or reputational gain from the scheme, or 
a loss avoided, this factor weighs against imposition of a bar because there 
was no evidence Conaway reaped any economic or pecuniary reward for his 
false statements. 
The fourth factor considers the current and potential future investor 
losses as a result of the defendant‘s misconduct.348  When Kmart‘s true 
financial position was announced, the value of its stock plummeted 
dramatically.349  This factor weighs strongly in favor of imposition of a bar 
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because of the widespread investor losses in the wake of public disclosure 
of the fraudulent scheme and Kmart‘s true financial picture. 
The fifth factor is the defendant‘s role in the scheme.350  Conaway, as 
CEO of Kmart, was central to the scheme to mislead the board of directors 
and investors.351  He approved the system that concealed Kmart‘s liquidity 
problems and discharged the executive who questioned the conduct.352  
This factor weighs in favor of a bar because Conaway was central to the 
scheme to defraud and fraudulently represent Kmart‘s financial state to 
investors. 
The sixth factor analyzes whether the defendant‘s professional 
occupation poses a risk of potential future violations.353  Conaway was 
terminated as CEO before the fraudulent scheme was discovered, so he was 
not in a professional position that could directly cause future violations.354  
He did, however, display little regard for the board of directors throughout 
his fraudulent conduct.355  There is nothing to suggest that Conaway would 
not pursue a similar scheme if he were able to secure future employment as 
an officer of a public corporation.  As considering future employment 
prospects is speculative, this factor weighs slightly against granting a bar. 
Viewing the factors as a whole, Bankosky‘s conduct merits a long-term 
or permanent bar for the following reasons:  his conduct represented blatant 
disregard for his fiduciary duties, evidenced by the duration of his conduct, 
the number of people he lied to, his central role in the scheme, and the 
substantial loss to Kmart‘s shareholders. 
2.   Bankosky 
The first factor of the new standard is whether the defendant‘s conduct is 
isolated or recurring.356  Bankosky‘s primary illegal trade was an isolated 
event.357  Bankosky‘s principal gains came from multiple trades 
surrounding a single piece of material, nonpublic information.  As there was 
no evidence of a systematic pattern of insider trading on multiple pieces of 
inside information, this factor therefore weighs against issuing a permanent 
bar. 
The second factor is the defendant‘s degree of scienter.358  Bankosky 
denied having knowledge of the negotiations before they were made public, 
yet evidence that the SEC presented at trial showed that he was aware of the 
confidential merger negotiations.359  His denial of the material, nonpublic 
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information on which he traded suggests that he knew his actions were 
illegal.  This factor weighs in favor of issuing a bar. 
The third factor analyzes the defendant‘s gain or loss avoided.360  It is 
undisputed that Bankosky had a direct financial gain as a result of his 
violation of the securities laws.361  This factor weighs in favor of a bar. 
The fourth factor considers the current and potential future investor 
losses as a result of the defendant‘s misconduct.362  Investor loss due to 
Bankosky‘s illegal trades is difficult to quantify, however, insider trading is 
commonly understood to result in investor harm.363  This factor therefore 
weighs in favor of imposing a bar. 
The fifth factor is the defendant‘s role in the scheme.364  Bankosky was 
central to his own insider trading.365  He also demonstrated that he knew the 
information was confidential and what he was doing was illegal based on 
his denial of wrongdoing.366  This factor weighs in favor of a bar. 
The sixth factor is whether the defendant‘s professional occupation poses 
a risk of potential future violations.367  Though the defendant was not in the 
position of officer or director at the time he made the illegal trades, he was 
acting in a fiduciary capacity as an employee of Takeda, which exposed 
him to confidential information.368  He violated his duty to his employer by 
trading on that confidential information.369  This factor weighs in favor of 
imposition of a bar. 
In analyzing Bankosky‘s conduct, the factors do weigh in favor of a 
finding of unfitness.  However, his conduct likely merits a shorter, time-
limited bar for the following reasons:  his conduct, while deliberate, did not 
represent a systematic pattern of behavior.  His personal gain does not rise 
to the amount that would significantly erode investor confidence, and 
investor loss does not rise to the same amount that Conaway‘s did.  Lastly, 
it is less likely that he would be promoted to an officer or director position. 
Under analysis of both Conaway and Bankosky, each defendant‘s 
conduct falls in favor of a bar imposition.  Unlike the highly deferential 
standard adopted in SEC v. Conaway, the proposed approach gives little 
room for an individual whose misconduct rose to the level of Conaway‘s to 
escape the imposition of a bar.  Applying the proposed standard achieves a 
more uniform result—crucial for the bar to effect its deterrence mechanism. 
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CONCLUSION 
Officer and director bars are a potent and necessary tool used by the SEC 
to deter misconduct which threatens to erode investor confidence in the 
financial markets.  While existing standards in Patel and Levine help 
somewhat in protecting the American investor from failures in corporate 
governance, they fail to further Congress‘s intent in establishing the bar as a 
key mechanism of deterrence. 
Ultimately, the proposed six-prong standard remedies the three principal 
shortcomings of the current Patel and Levine standards.  First, the proposed 
methodology reduces the potential that courts will grant bars inconsistently 
among various defendants.  By eliminating the use of ―intangible‖ 
considerations, courts have less flexibility to make an unfitness 
determination using factors which have little to do with misconduct that 
harms investors.  Second, the standard eliminates backward-looking 
concepts from criminal law, which aim to punish bad actors, and 
emphasizes forward-looking potential for recidivism, which deters bad acts.  
Third, the proposed standard recognizes that Patel was decided under a 
superseded statutory regime and updates the analysis to reflect 
congressional intent in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Lastly, the proposed 
standard addresses the Commission‘s need to properly respond to the 2008 
financial crisis and augment its authority to restore investor confidence in 
the markets. 
By adopting and using the proposed standard, courts can ensure that 
officer and director bars will more efficiently and effectively deter the 
fraudulent misconduct that threatens the ability of the American investor to 
entrust the financial markets with her hard-earned capital. 
 
